Janice Leaman v. Gregg Wolfe by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-17-2017 
Janice Leaman v. Gregg Wolfe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Janice Leaman v. Gregg Wolfe" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 1094. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/1094 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
Nos. 17-1467 & 17-1855 
____________ 
 
JANICE M. LEAMAN, 
Appellant in 17-1855 
 
 v. 
 
 GREGG B. WOLFE, 
Appellant in 17-1467 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-00975) 
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 8, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, and  
BRANN, District Judge.* 
 
(Opinion Filed:  November 17, 2017) 
____________ 
 
OPINION** 
____________ 
                                                 
* The Honorable Matthew W. Brann, United States District Judge for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
 ** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This dispute between former business partners Janice Leaman and Gregg Wolfe 
comes to us for the second time. After this Court held that Wolfe had breached his 2012 
settlement agreement with Leaman, the case was remanded to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to assess damages and attorney’s fees. 
Leaman v. Wolfe, 629 F. App’x 280 (3d Cir. 2015). The District Court awarded Leaman 
$38,873.32, which included $10,523.97 for prejudgment interest and $28,349.35 for 
attorney’s fees.  
Wolfe now appeals the District Court’s judgment, claiming the award is too high, 
while Leaman has filed a cross-appeal claiming the award is too low. Because we agree 
with the District Court in all respects, we will affirm. 
I1 
A 
We begin with the District Court’s assessment of prejudgment interest. The 
Court’s award of $10,523.97 was based on its conclusion that Leaman was entitled to 
enforce an acceleration clause in the settlement agreement after Wolfe defaulted on his 
February 2013 payment. Although the Court found Wolfe’s equitable arguments in 
support of his late payment “compelling,” it held that the assessment of interest was a 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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matter of legal right, not a matter of discretion. Leaman v. Wolfe, 2017 WL 528280, at *8 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2017).  
 The District Court’s legal analysis was sound. In breach of contract cases arising 
under Pennsylvania law, “interest is allowable at the legal rate from the time payment is 
withheld after it has become the duty of the debtor to make such payment.” Benefit Tr. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Union Nat’l Bank of Pittsburgh, 776 F.2d 1174, 1178 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(internal quotation marks and alteration removed in original) (quoting Palmgreen v. 
Palmer’s Garage, Inc., 117 A.2d 721, 722 (Pa. 1955)); see also Cresci Constr. Servs., 
Inc. v. Martin, 64 A.3d 254, 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). Assessment of interest “is a legal 
right ‘which arises upon breach or discontinuance of the contract provided the damages 
are then ascertainable by computation and even though a bona fide dispute exists as to the 
amount of the indebtedness.’” Benefit Tr. Life Ins. Co., 776 F.2d at 1178 (quoting 
Palmer’s Garage, 117 A.2d at 722); see also Cresci, 64 A.3d at 259 (“Recovery of 
prejudgment interest under this standard is a matter of law.”). Prejudgment interest is not 
punitive; it merely compensates the nondefaulting party for the loss of her money. Benefit 
Tr. Life Ins. Co., 776 F.2d at 1178 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354 
(Am. Law Inst. 1981)). 
As for the amount of interest due, Wolfe claims that he owes only $26.65, which is 
the accrued interest for 13 days at 6 percent on the single late payment in question of 
$12,500. Leaman counters that, since she exercised her right to accelerate all payments 
due after Wolfe defaulted, Wolfe became liable for interest on the entire amount, as 
reduced in time by each of Wolfe’s monthly payments. See 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 202. The 
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District Court accepted Leaman’s argument in this regard, and we find no error in its 
decision. Wolfe’s February 2013 default triggered the acceleration clause, which enabled 
Leaman to sue for “the entirety of the then unpaid balance of the Settlement Amount.” 
App. 97. Leaman exercised that right, which triggered Wolfe’s duty to pay the full 
amount. That duty was not vitiated by Wolfe’s decision to continue making monthly 
payments, nor by Leaman’s decision to mitigate her damages by accepting those 
payments. See Cresci, 64 A.3d at 259 (noting “interest is recoverable from the time for 
performance on the amount due less all deductions to which the party in breach is 
entitled” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354)). Accordingly, the 
District Court did not err in awarding Leaman prejudgment interest in the amount of 
$10,523.97.2 
B 
 We next turn to the parties’ challenges to the District Court’s award of attorney’s 
fees. Leaman asked the District Court to award her $70,505.92, which she claimed was 
the full amount under the lodestar method. Wolfe countered that Leaman was entitled to 
just $265.13, which represented the time he believed was necessary to prepare Leaman’s 
complaint in confession of judgment. The District Court rejected Wolfe’s argument, 
                                                 
 2 On appeal, Wolfe repeatedly references a letter in which he expresses his intent 
to continue making monthly payments as support for his argument that Leaman waived 
her right to accelerated interest. This document was not before the District Court on 
summary judgment, nor was it properly presented via a motion for reconsideration. 
Instead, it was attached to Wolfe’s opposition to Leaman’s motion for reconsideration, 
which only questioned the District Court’s award of attorney’s fees. Accordingly, it is not 
subject to review on appeal and, even if it were, it would fall well short of evidencing a 
waiver. 
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finding Leaman to be a prevailing party because she persuaded a panel of this Court that 
she was entitled to interest and attorney’s fees. Leaman, 2017 WL 528280, at *6. Because 
the District Court was plainly correct in this regard, we summarily reject Wolfe’s 
argument. 
 Although the District Court agreed with Leaman that she was a prevailing party 
entitled to attorney’s fees, the Court disagreed that $70,505.92 was the proper amount. 
For starters, the Court agreed with Wolfe that Leaman’s first counsel—who happened to 
be her husband, William Einhorn—did not justify his claimed rate of $400 per hour. 
Instead, the Court found that the appropriate rate for Einhorn was $203.95, which was the 
average rate of Leaman’s second law firm (Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle & 
Lombardo). When Einhorn’s revised fee amount was added to the reasonable fees of the 
Powell firm, the lodestar was $56,698.69. Because both sides achieved some success in 
the litigation, however, the District Court reduced the lodestar by 50 percent to 
$28,349.35.  
 Leaman insists the District Court erred when it reduced the lodestar amount, but 
we are unpersuaded. The District Court’s decision in this regard was discretionary. Rode 
v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990). We “may not upset a trial court’s 
exercise of discretion on the basis of a visceral disagreement with the lower court’s 
decision . . . [nor] where the trial court employs correct standards and procedures[] and 
makes findings of fact not clearly erroneous.” Washington v. Phila. Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation 
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omitted). Rather, we will defer where the District Court “applied the correct criteria to the 
facts of the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 After determining the lodestar, the District Court adjusted it based on its 
assessment of the degree to which Leaman succeeded in this litigation. See Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983). Consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction, the 
District Court determined whether Leaman’s unsuccessful claims were “unrelated” to the 
successful claims and whether she “achieve[d] a level of success that makes the hours 
reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” Id. at 434. Finding the 
claims to be inextricably intertwined, the Court considered the significance of the overall 
relief Leaman obtained “in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” 
Id. at 435. 
 The Court did not abuse its discretion in performing this task. See Mancini v. 
Northampton Cty., 836 F.3d 308, 321 (3d Cir. 2016). In determining the relative success 
of the parties, the Court noted that Leaman obtained a finding that Wolfe breached the 
contract, successfully defeated his “substantial performance” defense, obtained an order 
granting summary judgment against a counterclaim for breach of contract, and was 
awarded accelerated interest. For his part, Wolfe successfully reopened the confessed 
judgment and extricated himself from the $100,000 liquidated damages provision. The 
Court did not factor the $212,500 principal sum into its analysis, since Wolfe’s obligation 
to pay this amount “was never in dispute.” Leaman, 2017 WL 528280, at *8. Thus, the 
Court viewed the $100,000 liquidated damages provision—on which Wolfe prevailed—
as “the largest sum in dispute,” and it then compared this amount with the $10,523.39 
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Leaman earned in accelerated interest. Id. Based on these factors, as well as the fact that 
both parties were responsible for the contentious litigation, the Court reduced the award 
by 50 percent. 
 Leaman takes issue with the District Court’s analysis, arguing her principal claim 
was for breach of contract, which included successful recovery of the $212,500 principal. 
Although Leaman’s argument is not without force, the District Court’s contrary decision 
was far from an abuse of discretion. Because the Court “applied the correct criteria to the 
facts of the case,” we will defer to its decision. Washington, 89 F.3d at 1035; see also 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (noting that “the district court has discretion in determining the 
amount of a fee award” because of its “superior understanding of the litigation and the 
desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual 
matters”). 
 The same holds true for the District Court’s decision not to consider Leaman’s 
three additional months of invoices attached to her motion for reconsideration. Leaman 
did make the Court aware of her desire to provide additional timesheets in a footnote in 
her summary judgment motion. But in the intervening two months between submission of 
the motion and the Court’s decision, Leaman never attempted to supplement the record or 
explain why she could not have done so. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court 
that these timesheets did not provide a legitimate basis for Leaman’s motion for 
reconsideration. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that a 
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “must 
rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the 
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availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent 
manifest injustice” (citation omitted)); see also Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 
201 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A district court may properly refuse to consider evidence presented 
in a motion for reconsideration when the evidence was available prior to summary 
judgment.” (citation omitted)). 
C 
 Finally, we agree with the District Court that Leaman’s claim for consequential 
damages is without merit. Leaman’s suggestion that she could not begin working as a 
court reporter until this Court determined Wolfe had breached the settlement agreement is 
mistaken. The settlement agreement rendered the noncompete provision null and void 
once Wolfe defaulted in February 2013. See App. 104 (adopting this interpretation in 
Leaman’s notice of default). Accordingly, Leaman did not need a court determination to 
begin working.  
II 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in all 
respects. 
